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Trump Administration Explored Resuming Nuclear Testing — First Time Since 1992

The Washington Post reported in May 2020 that senior Trump administration officials — including representatives from the Defense and State Departments — discussed at a meeting whether to conduct a nuclear test explosion. The discussions were presented as leverage in arms control negotiations with Russia and China. No test took place, but the public discussion of resuming testing — after a 28-year U.S. moratorium — was treated by arms control experts as a significant destabilization of the global non-proliferation architecture. The Trump administration had already withdrawn from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and signaled disinterest in extending New START.

Record summary

Grade

Grade 4 of 5: Critical Rights and Rule-of-Law Concern

Systematic actions that undermine fundamental constitutional or international legal protections at the structural level. Scale and definitions

Status
Concluded
Incident date
Location
Washington, D.C.
Category
Foreign Policy & War
Legal posture
Reported
War-crime classification
Enabling conduct
Verification
Independently verified
ICC relevance
No
Sources
3 cited
Stable ID
trump-nuclear-testing-resumption-order
Victims
Global non-proliferation framework; populations at risk from nuclear proliferation; future generations; peoples of Pacific and Central Asian territories who bore historical nuclear testing consequences
Alleged responsible parties
  • Donald Trump, President; oversaw administration discussions of resuming nuclear testing— White House

Key points

  • Senior Trump administration officials met in May 2020 to discuss whether to conduct a nuclear test explosion — the first time since 1992 that U.S. officials had seriously considered ending the testing moratorium
  • The discussions were reportedly connected to attempts to use the prospect of U.S. testing as leverage in arms control negotiations with Russia and China, who the administration accused of conducting low-yield nuclear tests in violation of the CTBT
  • The United States has not ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; however, it has observed the testing moratorium since 1992 — a 28-year period that had become foundational to global non-proliferation norms
  • Arms control experts warned that any U.S. resumption of nuclear testing would trigger a cascade: Russia and China would resume testing, and the CTBT's practical effect — even without U.S. ratification — would collapse
  • The Trump administration had already withdrawn from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) in 2019 and was resisting extension of the New START strategic arms agreement
  • No nuclear test took place; the Biden administration subsequently extended New START and reaffirmed the U.S. moratorium on testing

Overview

For 28 years, the United States had not detonated a nuclear weapon. The moratorium, in place since 1992, had become a foundational element of the global non-proliferation framework — one that operated even without the U.S. ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

In May 2020, the Trump administration discussed ending that moratorium.

The Context

The discussions were framed as leverage. The administration accused Russia and China of conducting low-yield nuclear tests in violation of the CTBT, and some officials proposed that the U.S. ability to demonstrate it could test — or actually testing — might pressure those countries into arms control compliance.

Arms control experts noted the flaw in this reasoning: U.S. testing would not constrain Russian or Chinese testing. It would remove the last remaining norm-based constraint on their testing programs and end three decades of global progress toward a test-free world.

The Broader Pattern

The nuclear testing discussions were not an isolated event. The Trump administration had already withdrawn from the INF Treaty in 2019. It was resisting extension of New START, the strategic arms reduction treaty that caps deployed nuclear warheads. It had increased the Defense Department's nuclear weapons budget and loosened the criteria for nuclear first use in its Nuclear Posture Review.

The administration systematically dismantled the architecture of nuclear restraint that had been built over four decades. The testing discussions were the most visible expression of that project.

International law engaged

InstrumentProvisionWhat it protects or prohibits
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban TreatyArticle IEach State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion — the CTBT has not entered into force but represents a global norm; U.S. resumption would fundamentally undermine it
Nuclear Non-Proliferation TreatyArticle VIStates possessing nuclear weapons shall pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament — resuming testing would violate the spirit of Article VI

Update log

  1. Documented from initial reporting.

Sequence of events

  1. Trump withdraws from INF Treaty

    The Trump administration formally withdraws the United States from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, citing Russian violations. Russia and China had opposed the treaty. Arms control experts warn the withdrawal removes a key constraint on intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe and Asia.

  2. Nuclear testing discussions reported

    The Washington Post and New York Times report that senior administration officials discussed whether to conduct a nuclear test explosion in May 2020. The discussions involved Defense and State Department representatives and were framed as potential leverage in trilateral arms control talks with Russia and China.

  3. Biden extends New START, reaffirms moratorium

    The Biden administration extends the New START strategic arms reduction treaty with Russia for five years and reaffirms the U.S. commitment to the nuclear testing moratorium. The New START extension had been opposed by the Trump administration.

Sources

  1. Trump administration discussed conducting first U.S. nuclear test in decades — The Washington Post
  2. U.S. Officials Discussed Resuming Nuclear Testing, Officials Say — The New York Times
  3. Trump Administration's Nuclear Testing Discussions: A Dangerous Step Backward — Arms Control Association

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Manually curated This entry was added directly and does not carry an automated audit trail.

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