On February 5, 2026, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) formally expired, ending the last legally binding nuclear arms control agreement between the United States and Russia. No successor treaty has been negotiated or is currently under negotiation. For the first time since the early 1970s — over five decades — there are no binding limits on the strategic nuclear forces of the two nations that together possess approximately 90% of the world's nuclear weapons.
\nNew START, originally signed in 2010 and extended for five years in 2021, imposed the following limits on each side:
\nBeyond the numerical limits, the treaty established a comprehensive verification regime that included on-site inspections, regular data exchanges on force composition and deployments, notifications of changes, and a Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) for resolving compliance questions. These transparency mechanisms provided both sides with insights into the other's nuclear posture, reducing the risk of miscalculation and worst-case planning.
\nRussia suspended compliance with New START in February 2023 following the escalation of tensions over Ukraine, halting inspections and data exchanges. In September 2025, Russian President Putin publicly proposed that both nations continue to observe New START limits for one year after the treaty's expiration. The United States did not formally respond to this proposal. Instead, President Trump posted on social media on February 5, 2026, that the US would seek a \"new, improved, and modernized Treaty that can last long into the future\" — without initiating negotiations.
\nThe expiration of New START implicates the nuclear disarmament obligations that both the United States and Russia have undertaken under international law:
\nNPT Article VI: Both the US and Russia are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which requires them \"to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.\" Allowing the last arms control treaty to lapse without pursuing a successor raises questions about compliance with this obligation.
\nICJ Advisory Opinion (1996): The International Court of Justice unanimously concluded that \"there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.\" Letting New START expire without engaged negotiations to replace it is arguably inconsistent with this obligation.
\nEnabling classification: While the treaty's expiration does not itself constitute a war crime, it removes the structural constraints that prevent nuclear escalation. It enables worst-case planning, unconstrained arms buildups, and increases the risk of nuclear conflict — making it an enabling condition for potential future catastrophic harm.
\nThis incident receives a critical severity classification because:
\nThe following international law provisions are implicated:
\nOn October 30, 2025, President Donald Trump publicly ordered the Pentagon to resume nuclear weapons testing, announcing on social media that \"because of other countries' nuclear testing programs,\" he wants the \"Department of War to start testing our nuclear weapons on an equal basis.\" The announcement appeared to be a response to Russia's recently publicized test of a nuclear delivery system.
\nThis directive threatens to break a 33-year US moratorium on nuclear testing that has been in place since 1992, when President George H.W. Bush signed legislation imposing the halt. The last US nuclear weapons test was conducted on September 23, 1992, at the Nevada Test Site. No country other than North Korea has conducted a nuclear test since the 1990s.
\nThe global norm against nuclear testing is one of the most successful arms control achievements in history. While the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) has never entered into force due to non-ratification by key states including the United States, the de facto moratorium has held for over three decades. The United States signed the CTBT in 1996, creating a legal obligation under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties not to defeat the treaty's object and purpose.
\nThe moratorium has been maintained through voluntary restraint by all nuclear-armed states except North Korea. Arms control experts warn that if the United States — the world's preeminent military power — resumes testing, it would provide cover and justification for Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and potentially other states to resume their own testing programs, triggering a cascade that would collapse the global norm entirely.
\nAs of March 2026, it remains unclear what specific policy changes have resulted from Trump's order. CSIS analysis notes that the Nevada National Security Site would require significant preparation — potentially years — before a nuclear test could be conducted. However, the political signal sent by the order itself has already damaged the global testing norm.
\nCTBT obligations: While the US has not ratified the CTBT, it signed the treaty in 1996. Under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, signatory states are obligated not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty they have signed. Resuming nuclear testing would directly violate this obligation.
\nNPT Article VI: Both the US and Russia are parties to the NPT, which requires pursuit of \"effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race.\" Resuming nuclear testing moves in the opposite direction — accelerating the arms race rather than restraining it.
\nCustomary international law: The 33-year moratorium, maintained by every nuclear-armed state except North Korea, may have crystallized into a norm of customary international law. Breaking it would violate this norm.
\nICJ Advisory Opinion: The International Court of Justice's 1996 advisory opinion established the obligation to pursue and conclude nuclear disarmament negotiations. Resuming testing is antithetical to this obligation.
\nThis incident receives a severe severity classification because:
\nThe following international law provisions are implicated:
\nOn December 2, 2025, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth signed a memo that reversed decades of bipartisan progress toward eliminating antipersonnel landmines. The memo, first reported by the Washington Post on December 19, made two sweeping changes:
\nReversed the US landmine ban: The Biden-era policy prohibiting US use of antipersonnel landmines outside the Korean Peninsula was rescinded. Combatant commanders were given authority to deploy antipersonnel mines anywhere in the world, without geographic restriction, at their discretion.
\nRescinded the US Humanitarian Mine Program: The decades-old government initiative that had provided over $5 billion in assistance to more than 125 countries to find and destroy unexploded landmines since 1993 was terminated. Mine-clearing nonprofits funded by the program were ordered to cease operations \"effective immediately.\"
\nThe United States was the world's largest global donor to mine-clearing actions in 2024. The rescission of funding cuts off not only US government demining efforts but also the extensive network of nonprofits that depended on US funding to clear mines in post-conflict zones worldwide.
\nThe memo described the policy as providing US warfighters with a \"force multiplier,\" stating the US military is in \"one of the most dangerous security environments in its history.\" Hegseth's memo authorized the use of what the Pentagon calls \"non-persistent\" mines — landmines equipped with self-destruct and self-deactivation mechanisms. However, these weapons are still banned under the Ottawa Treaty, and their self-destruct mechanisms have historically proven unreliable, leaving unexploded mines in the field that function as persistent threats to civilians.
\nAntipersonnel landmines are inherently indiscriminate weapons. They cannot distinguish between a soldier and a child. Once placed, they remain active for years or decades, long after conflicts end. According to the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, civilians made up 90% of all recorded landmine casualties in 2024. Children are disproportionately affected, as they are less likely to recognize minefields and more vulnerable to the injuries mines cause.
\nOttawa Treaty: While the United States has never signed the Ottawa Treaty, US policy had been progressively aligning with the treaty's goals under administrations of both parties. The Obama administration restricted use to the Korean Peninsula in 2014. Biden reinstated those restrictions in 2022. The Hegseth reversal moves US policy in the opposite direction, away from the international consensus held by 164 nations.
\nIHL prohibition on indiscriminate weapons: International humanitarian law prohibits weapons that cannot distinguish between combatants and civilians. Antipersonnel landmines are the paradigmatic indiscriminate weapon — they detonate when any person steps on them, regardless of whether that person is a soldier, a farmer, or a child.
\nEnabling classification: The policy reversal does not itself cause casualties, but it enables future harm by authorizing the deployment of weapons that are designed to kill indiscriminately and by dismantling the world's largest demining program. The combination of authorizing new mine use while halting mine clearance creates a multiplier effect on civilian risk.
\nThis incident receives a severe severity classification because:
\nThe following international law provisions are implicated:
\nOn September 30, 2025, the US Department of Defense quietly awarded a contract to Tomer, an Israeli state-owned arms company, for the production of 155mm High Explosive Advanced Submunition (XM1208) projectiles — cluster munitions. The initial delivery order was valued at $210 million, with the indefinite delivery/quantity contract carrying a ceiling value of $829.1 million. The contract was first reported by The Intercept on February 6, 2026.
\nThe deal represents the largest known US arms purchase from Israel in at least 18 years of available federal procurement records. It was awarded without public competition, using a \"public interest\" exception to bypass normal procurement rules.
\nCluster munitions are weapons that open in mid-air and scatter smaller submunitions — often called bomblets — over a wide area. They pose two distinct threats to civilians:
\nAt the time of use: The wide-area effect means submunitions land across a broad zone, making it impossible to limit their impact to military targets. Anyone in the area — soldiers, farmers, children — is at equal risk.
\nAfter the conflict: A significant percentage of submunitions fail to explode on impact, remaining in the soil as de facto landmines. These unexploded submunitions kill and maim civilians for years and decades after use, often detonating when disturbed by agricultural activity, children's play, or foot traffic.
\nFor these reasons, 111 nations have banned cluster munitions under the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions. Neither the United States nor Israel has joined this treaty.
\nThe US had been drawing down its cluster munition stockpiles for years. The decision to contract for the industrial-scale production of new cluster munitions represents a reversal of that trend and a significant step backward from the international consensus against these weapons.
\nConvention on Cluster Munitions: While the US is not a party to the Convention, the production of new cluster munitions at industrial scale directly undermines the global norm established by the treaty's 111 states parties. The purchase sends a signal that the US is moving away from, rather than toward, the international consensus.
\nIHL prohibition on indiscriminate weapons: Cluster munitions scatter submunitions across wide areas, making it inherently difficult to limit their effects to military objectives. This wide-area effect raises serious questions about compliance with the IHL prohibition on indiscriminate weapons and the principle of distinction.
\nProbable war crime classification: The classification is based not on the procurement itself but on the near-certainty that these weapons, if used, will cause civilian casualties due to their inherently indiscriminate nature and the long-term hazard of unexploded submunitions. Producing them at scale signals intent to use them.
\nNo-bid contract concerns: Bypassing competitive procurement using a \"public interest\" exception raises transparency and accountability questions. The lack of public disclosure until investigative reporting revealed the contract five months later suggests an effort to avoid scrutiny.
\nThis incident receives a severe severity classification because:
\nThe following international law provisions are implicated:
\nIn February and March 2025, the Trump administration systematically dismantled the Pentagon's Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response (CHMR) program, including the Civilian Protection Center of Excellence. The program, which had been formalized through a 2022 action plan and DOD Instruction 3000.17, employed approximately 200 personnel dedicated to reducing civilian casualties in U.S. military operations.
\nDefense Secretary Pete Hegseth framed civilian protection as a constraint on military \"lethality,\" characterizing the CHMR program as a \"woke\" initiative that \"ties the hands of combatant commanders.\" The program and its Center of Excellence were tagged for elimination as part of an announced 8% cut to Pentagon programs, with particular emphasis on cutting \"non-lethal programs.\"
\nThe CHMR program had its roots in the first Trump administration, when Secretary James Mattis ordered a review of civilian casualties in U.S. targeting operations during the campaign against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. That review documented how inadequate civilian harm processes had led to unnecessary civilian deaths that undermined both the moral standing and the strategic effectiveness of U.S. military operations. The Biden administration formalized the resulting recommendations into a comprehensive action plan and Defense Department instruction.
\nThe program's approximately 30 personnel at the Civilian Protection Center of Excellence near the Pentagon, plus roughly 170 more across combatant commands, were responsible for:
\nThe dismantlement occurred months before the administration launched three separate military campaigns:
\nCaribbean Drug Boat Strikes (September 2025 onward): At least 26 strikes killing at least 95 people, with no published evidence that the victims were carrying drugs or any identification of the dead. The \"double tap\" strike of September 2 -- killing shipwrecked survivors -- occurred without the civilian harm review infrastructure that would have flagged this as a potential war crime.
\nVenezuela Military Intervention (January 2026): Operation Absolute Resolve, including bombing of infrastructure across northern Venezuela, was conducted without the civilian harm assessment processes that the CHMR program had been designed to provide.
\nIran War (February 2026 onward): A Tomahawk cruise missile struck the Shajareh Tayyebeh girls' elementary school in Minab, killing 175+ schoolchildren. As ProPublica documented, the civilian harm program that might have prevented this strike -- or at minimum triggered an immediate accountability process -- had been dismantled months earlier.
\nThe obligation to minimize civilian casualties is not optional under international humanitarian law. The Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol I, and customary IHL require parties to armed conflict to:
\nThe Rome Statute (Article 8(2)(b)(iv)) classifies as a war crime the intentional launching of an attack \"in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians...which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.\"
\nDismantling the institutional infrastructure designed to fulfill these obligations does not relieve the obligation itself. It does, however, make violations more likely and accountability less achievable.
\nThe deliberate removal of civilian harm safeguards before launching multiple military campaigns establishes an enabling condition for war crimes. The CHMR program existed specifically to prevent the kinds of incidents that subsequently occurred. Its elimination was not incidental -- it was a policy choice to prioritize \"lethality\" over civilian protection, framed as removing constraints on military action.
\nIn the context of ICC relevance, the deliberate dismantlement of civilian protection mechanisms may be relevant to establishing the mental element of war crimes charges. If civilian deaths result from operations conducted without the safeguards that were specifically designed to prevent them, and those safeguards were deliberately removed, the question of whether the resulting civilian harm was \"known\" or foreseeable becomes more straightforward.
", "citation": "Dismantlement of Pentagon Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Program. https://trumpswarcrimes.com/incident/dismantlement-civilian-harm-mitigation. Published February 28, 2025. Updated March 25, 2026." } ] }